The aim of this course is to familiarize students with the
sociological study of science - science seen as one of the great institutions of
contemporary society. Both the influence of cultural and social structures on
scientific knowledge and the impact of science and technology on society will be
analyzed through the use of the methods and theories of sociology.
TYPOLOGY OF THE COURSE
30 hours (first semester/ two hours a week), konwersatorium.
The lecturer will present one topic of the program in the first hour and will
require the participation of students in a free discussion in the second hour.
EVALUATION
No marks. Students will be asked to attend the course
regularly and to participate actively. At the end of the course, they will be
asked to write a short paper (3/4 pages) in English about one of the themes of
the program and to present it in class. Those who fulfill these requirements
will obtain a "zaliczenie".
TOPICS OF THE COURSE
With regard to the influence of society on science and
technology, great attention will be paid to the work of Robert K. Merton -
putative father of the sociology of science - and his major substantive
contributions: e.g., normative structure of science, reward system, San Matthew
effect, theory of multiple discoveries, ambivalence of scientists, etc. By
following the theoretical orientation of Merton, Sztompka, and Bunge, sociology
itself (that is, the instrument) will be treated as a scientific discipline
among others, aiming to achieve certified knowledge. This rationalistic approach
should permit us to avoid the epistemological problem of reflexivity, which
undermines the heuristic validity of the relativist-constructivist approach. The
main ideas of the post-Mertonian schools in the sociology of science will also
be examined, especially Bloor’s strong program and the claims of the
relativist-constructivist movement (Collins, Knorr-Cetina, Krohn and others).
These readings will permit students to familiarize themselves with the climate
of the so-called "Science Wars" which presently characterizes the
meta-scientific debate. The debate in the philosophy and sociology of science
has probably never been so heated as now. In recent centuries, individual
scholars or entire schools of thought have engaged in various disputes over
different (sometimes conflicting, sometimes mutually enriching) images of
science. More recently the situation has changed significantly: in the
present-day debate, not only is a particular image of science questioned, but science
itself, as an institution and as a specific type of knowledge is challenged.
In the past, the main aim of the philosophy and sociology of science was to
establish the boundaries between science and other forms of knowledge rationally
and empirically. This distinction has, in principle, also had to be functional
for the detection and refutation of pseudo-science. That is, of non-scientific
knowledge presented under the denomination of "science" in order to
get social and academic credits. Today pseudoscience seems to be a minor problem.
Science has gained such a bad name that it is sometimes easier to obtain credit
by presenting ideas explicitly devoid of any connection with laboratories,
experiments, mathematics, and rigorous reasoning. Now the main distinction in
the market of ideas seems to be that between science and anti-science,
or more precisely between pro-science philosophy/sociology and anti-science
philosophy/sociology. The selected bibliography should help students to
understand the dynamics of this metascientific debate.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Merton R. (1973), The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical
Investigations, Chigago, University of Chicago Press.
Ziman J. M. (1984), An Introduction to Science Studies, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Ziman J. M. (2000), Real Science: What It Is and What It Means,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Bunge M. (1998), Social Science under Debate: A Philosophical Perspective,
Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
Sztompka P. (1986), Robert K. Merton: An Intellectual Profile, Hong
Kong, MacMillan.
Campa R. (2001), Epistemological Dimensions of Robert Merton’s
Sociology, Torun, Nicholas Copernicus University Press.
Campa, R. M. (1998), "The Epistemological Relevance of Merton’s
Sociology of Science." Ruch Filozoficzny, Tom LV, No. 2.
Barnes S. B. and Dolby G. A. (1970), "The Scientific Ethos: A deviant
view point", Paris, Archives Européennes de Sociologie: Tome XI,
Numéro I: 3-25.
Bloor, D. (1976), Knowledge and Social Imagery. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
Collins, H. M. (1983), "An Empirical Relativist Programme in the
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge." In Science Observed, ed. K. D.
Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay, 85-113. London: Sage.
Knorr-Cetina K. D. (1982). "The Constructivist Programme in the
Sociology of Science: Retreats or Advances?" Social Studies of Science,
Vol. 12: 320-324.
Krohn, R. (1982). "On Gieryn on the ‘Relativist/Constructivist’
Programme in the Sociology of Science: Naïveté and Reaction." Social
Studies of Science, Vol. 12: 325-328.
Gieryn, T. F. (1982a). "Relativist/Constructivist Programmes in the
Sociology of Science: Redundance and Retreat." Social Studies of
Science, Vol. 12: 279-297.
Gieryn, T. F. (1982b). "Not-Last Words: Worn-Out Dichotomies in the
Sociology of Science." Social Studies of Science, Vol. 12:
329-335.
Bunge, M. (1996). "In Praise of Intolerance to Charlatanism in Academia."
The Flight from Science and Reason, Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, Vol. 775, June.
Horgan, J. (1997). The end of science, Broadway Books, New York.
STRUCTURE OF THE COURSE
October (Mertonian readings)
Merton R., "The normative structure of science", in Merton (1973).
Merton R., "Singletons and Multiples in Science", in Merton
(1973).
Merton R., "The Matthew Effect in Science", in Merton (1973).
4. Merton R., "Age, Aging, and Age Structure in
Science", in Merton (1973).
November (the interpretations of Merton’s work)
Bunge M. (1998): 229-242.
Sztompka P. (1986).
Campa R. (2001): 143-161, 175-191.
Campa, R. (1998).
December (the relativist-constructivist approach)
Barnes S. B. and Dolby G. A. (1970).
Bloor, D. (1976).
Collins, H. M. (1983).
Knorr-Cetina K. D. (1982).
Krohn, R. (1982).
January (criticism to the relativistic approaches)